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With CLTV active, the operand check is the transaction's CheckLockTime

Proved
BitcoinHtlc.cltv_concrete

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip65bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetbolt3checkmultisigcltvformal-verificationhtlclightningp2wshscript

For f.cltv = true and 0≤expiry0 \le {\rm expiry}0≤expiry: CltvPasses f (legacyOracle sf tx nIn amount v sc) expiry ↔ checkLockTime tx nIn expiry = true.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinHtlc
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
open BitcoinToLocal BitcoinSig BitcoinVerify
open BitcoinScript
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinHtlc.cltv_concrete (f : Flags) (sf : BitcoinSig.SigFlags) (tx : BitcoinSer.Tx) (nIn : Nat) (amount : Int)
    (v : BitcoinSig.SigVersion) (sc : Bytes) (expiry : Int) (hcltv : f.cltv = true) (h0 : 0 ≤ expiry) :
    BitcoinHtlc.CltvPasses f (BitcoinSig.legacyOracle sf tx nIn amount v sc) expiry ↔
      BitcoinSig.checkLockTime tx nIn expiry = true := by sorry
Source
BOLT #3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, 'Offered HTLC Outputs' and 'Received HTLC Outputs': https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md#offered-htlc-outputs; Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: EvalScript (OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, OP_EQUAL, OP_IF/OP_NOTIF, OP_SWAP, OP_SIZE, OP_CHECKMULTISIG, OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, OP_CHECKSIG), GenericTransactionSignatureChecker::CheckLockTime (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); BIP65, BIP141, BIP147
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinHtlc.cltv_concrete

Statement. Let fff be any interpreter flag set, sf\mathit{sf}sf any signature-layer flag set, tx\mathit{tx}tx any transaction, nnn any natural number (input index), aaa any integer (amount), vvv either of the two signature versions base\mathrm{base}base or witnessV0\mathrm{witnessV0}witnessV0, sc\mathit{sc}sc any byte string (script code), and eee any integer, under the two hypotheses f.cltv=truef.\mathrm{cltv} = \mathrm{true}f.cltv=true and 0≤e0 \le e0≤e. The theorem asserts

CltvPasses(f, O(sf,tx,n,a,v,sc), e)  ⟺  CLT(tx,n,e)=true,\mathrm{CltvPasses}\bigl(f,\ \mathcal{O}(\mathit{sf}, \mathit{tx}, n, a, v, \mathit{sc}),\ e\bigr) \iff \mathrm{CLT}(\mathit{tx}, n, e) = \mathrm{true},CltvPasses(f, O(sf,tx,n,a,v,sc), e)⟺CLT(tx,n,e)=true,

where O(… )\mathcal{O}(\dots)O(…) is the concrete "legacy oracle" built from these parameters and CLT\mathrm{CLT}CLT is the transcribed CheckLockTime, both unfolded below. Since the oracle's lock-time component is by definition CLT(tx,n,⋅)\mathrm{CLT}(\mathit{tx}, n, \cdot)CLT(tx,n,⋅), the left-hand side unfolds literally to f.cltv=false∨(0≤e∧CLT(tx,n,e)=true)f.\mathrm{cltv} = \mathrm{false} \lor (0 \le e \land \mathrm{CLT}(\mathit{tx}, n, e) = \mathrm{true})f.cltv=false∨(0≤e∧CLT(tx,n,e)=true). The parameters sf,a,v,sc\mathit{sf}, a, v, \mathit{sc}sf,a,v,sc enter only through the oracle's signature component, which the statement does not consult.


Definitions unfolded

Basic notions used throughout. A byte is an 8-bit word and a byte string (written Bytes\mathrm{Bytes}Bytes) is a finite list of bytes; ∣b∣|b|∣b∣ denotes the length of a byte string bbb. The constant Lmax⁡=520L_{\max} = 520Lmax​=520 is the interpreter's maximum size of one stack element. A flag set fff consists of three Booleans f.cltvf.\mathrm{cltv}f.cltv, f.csvf.\mathrm{csv}f.csv, f.nulldummyf.\mathrm{nulldummy}f.nulldummy. An oracle ooo is an arbitrary structure supplying eight functions with no constraints whatsoever on their behaviour: o.ripemd160,o.sha1,o.sha256,o.hash160,o.hash256:Bytes→Byteso.\mathrm{ripemd160}, o.\mathrm{sha1}, o.\mathrm{sha256}, o.\mathrm{hash160}, o.\mathrm{hash256} : \mathrm{Bytes}\to\mathrm{Bytes}o.ripemd160,o.sha1,o.sha256,o.hash160,o.hash256:Bytes→Bytes (so in particular o.hash160o.\mathrm{hash160}o.hash160 is any function from byte strings to byte strings, not necessarily RIPEMD160∘\circ∘SHA256, not necessarily 20-byte-valued), o.checkSig:Bytes→Bytes→Option Boolo.\mathrm{checkSig} : \mathrm{Bytes}\to\mathrm{Bytes}\to \mathrm{Option}\,\mathrm{Bool}o.checkSig:Bytes→Bytes→OptionBool (first argument the signature, second the public key; the value none\mathrm{none}none represents a script-aborting failure, some b\mathrm{some}\,bsomeb a verdict bbb), o.checkLockTime:Z→Boolo.\mathrm{checkLockTime} : \mathbb{Z}\to\mathrm{Bool}o.checkLockTime:Z→Bool and o.checkSequence:Z→Boolo.\mathrm{checkSequence} : \mathbb{Z}\to\mathrm{Bool}o.checkSequence:Z→Bool. Stacks are lists written top element first. castToBool(b)\mathrm{castToBool}(b)castToBool(b) is: false for the empty string; for a one-byte string [x][x][x], true iff x≠0x\neq 0x=0 and x≠0x80x \neq 0\mathrm{x}80x=0x80; for x::rx :: rx::r with rrr non-empty, true iff x≠0x\neq 0x=0 or castToBool(r)\mathrm{castToBool}(r)castToBool(r) (so a string of zero bytes whose last byte is 0x800\mathrm{x}800x80 is false). boolBytes(true)=[0x01]\mathrm{boolBytes}(\mathrm{true}) = [0\mathrm{x}01]boolBytes(true)=[0x01] and boolBytes(false)=[]\mathrm{boolBytes}(\mathrm{false}) = []boolBytes(false)=[] (the empty string). The script-number encoding ser(v)\mathrm{ser}(v)ser(v) of an integer vvv is: [][][] if v=0v = 0v=0; otherwise the little-endian bytes of ∣v∣|v|∣v∣ with no trailing zero byte, then, if the last of those bytes has its top bit (0x800\mathrm{x}800x80) set, an extra byte 0x800\mathrm{x}800x80 (for v<0v<0v<0) or 0x000\mathrm{x}000x00 (for v>0v>0v>0) is appended, and otherwise, for v<0v<0v<0, the top bit of the last byte is set. For example ser(2)=[0x02]\mathrm{ser}(2) = [0\mathrm{x}02]ser(2)=[0x02] and ser(32)=[0x20]\mathrm{ser}(32) = [0\mathrm{x}20]ser(32)=[0x20]. The decoding numk(b)\mathrm{num}_k(b)numk​(b) ("script number of at most kkk bytes, non-minimal encodings allowed") is none\mathrm{none}none if ∣b∣>k|b| > k∣b∣>k, and otherwise some\mathrm{some}some of the little-endian value of bbb with the top bit of the last byte read as a sign (the empty string decodes to 000).

The lock-time predicate. CltvPasses(f,o,e)\mathrm{CltvPasses}(f, o, e)CltvPasses(f,o,e), for a flag set fff, an oracle ooo and an integer eee, is the proposition

f.cltv=false ∨ (0≤e ∧ o.checkLockTime(e)=true),f.\mathrm{cltv} = \mathrm{false}\ \lor\ \bigl(0 \le e\ \land\ o.\mathrm{checkLockTime}(e) = \mathrm{true}\bigr),f.cltv=false ∨ (0≤e ∧ o.checkLockTime(e)=true),

so it holds unconditionally when the cltv flag is off, and otherwise requires eee non-negative and the oracle's lock-time check to accept eee.

The concrete oracle O(sf,tx,n,a,v,sc)\mathcal{O}(\mathit{sf}, \mathit{tx}, n, a, v, \mathit{sc})O(sf,tx,n,a,v,sc) ("legacy oracle") for signature-layer flags sf\mathit{sf}sf, a transaction tx\mathit{tx}tx, an input index nnn, an amount a∈Za \in \mathbb{Z}a∈Z, a signature version v∈{base,witnessV0}v \in \{\mathrm{base}, \mathrm{witnessV0}\}v∈{base,witnessV0} and a script-code byte string sc\mathit{sc}sc is the oracle whose five hash functions are the concrete transcriptions of SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPEMD-160, hash256=SHA256∘SHA256\mathrm{hash256} = \mathrm{SHA256}\circ\mathrm{SHA256}hash256=SHA256∘SHA256 and hash160=RIPEMD160∘SHA256\mathrm{hash160} = \mathrm{RIPEMD160}\circ\mathrm{SHA256}hash160=RIPEMD160∘SHA256; whose checkLockTime\mathrm{checkLockTime}checkLockTime is CLT(tx,n,⋅)\mathrm{CLT}(\mathit{tx}, n, \cdot)CLT(tx,n,⋅) and checkSequence\mathrm{checkSequence}checkSequence the analogous transcription of CheckSequence; and whose checkSig(sig,pk)\mathrm{checkSig}(\mathit{sig}, \mathit{pk})checkSig(sig,pk) is the pre-tapscript check: for v=witnessV0v = \mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0 the script code is used as is (for v=basev = \mathrm{base}v=base every push of sig\mathit{sig}sig is first deleted from it); it is none\mathrm{none}none if the signature-encoding check or the public-key-encoding check under sf\mathit{sf}sf fails, and otherwise some\mathrm{some}some of the ECDSA verdict. The signature-layer flags are four Booleans dersig,lowS,strictenc,witnessPubkeyType\mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{lowS}, \mathrm{strictenc}, \mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}dersig,lowS,strictenc,witnessPubkeyType; the signature-encoding check accepts an empty signature, otherwise rejects a non-strict-DER encoding when any of dersig,lowS,strictenc\mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{lowS}, \mathrm{strictenc}dersig,lowS,strictenc is set, rejects a high-S signature when lowS\mathrm{lowS}lowS is set, and rejects an undefined hash-type byte when strictenc\mathrm{strictenc}strictenc is set; the public-key-encoding check rejects a key that is neither compressed nor uncompressed when strictenc\mathrm{strictenc}strictenc is set and a non-compressed key under witnessV0\mathrm{witnessV0}witnessV0 when witnessPubkeyType\mathrm{witnessPubkeyType}witnessPubkeyType is set. The ECDSA verdict is false when the key's header byte does not announce its length (0x02/0x030\mathrm{x}02/0\mathrm{x}030x02/0x03 for 33 bytes, 0x04/0x06/0x070\mathrm{x}04/0\mathrm{x}06/0\mathrm{x}070x04/0x06/0x07 for 65 bytes, anything else invalid), when the signature is empty, or when v=witnessV0v = \mathrm{witnessV0}v=witnessV0 and a<0a < 0a<0; otherwise the last byte of the signature is the hash type, the signature hash is the BIP143 digest (for witnessV0\mathrm{witnessV0}witnessV0, over tx\mathit{tx}tx, input nnn, the script code, the amount aaa and the hash type) or the legacy digest (for base\mathrm{base}base), and the verdict is secp256k1 ECDSA verification of the remaining signature bytes (lax DER parsing, S normalised to the low half, the digest reduced modulo the group order) against the parsed key. CLT(tx,n,t)\mathrm{CLT}(\mathit{tx}, n, t)CLT(tx,n,t), for t∈Zt \in \mathbb{Z}t∈Z, is: false unless either both tx.nLockTime<500 000 000\mathit{tx}.\mathrm{nLockTime} < 500\,000\,000tx.nLockTime<500000000 and t<500 000 000t < 500\,000\,000t<500000000, or both tx.nLockTime≥500 000 000\mathit{tx}.\mathrm{nLockTime} \ge 500\,000\,000tx.nLockTime≥500000000 and t≥500 000 000t \ge 500\,000\,000t≥500000000; then false if tx.nLockTime<t\mathit{tx}.\mathrm{nLockTime} < ttx.nLockTime<t; then false if the nSequence of input nnn of tx\mathit{tx}tx equals 0xffffffff0\mathrm{xffffffff}0xffffffff, where, if nnn is not a valid input index, a default input with nSequence 000 is used; and true otherwise. When the oracle comes from a consensus flag set FFF (Booleans p2sh,witness,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummy\mathrm{p2sh}, \mathrm{witness}, \mathrm{taproot}, \mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{cltv}, \mathrm{csv}, \mathrm{nulldummy}p2sh,witness,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummy), the interpreter flags are scriptFlagsOf(F)=(F.cltv,F.csv,F.nulldummy)\mathrm{scriptFlagsOf}(F) = (F.\mathrm{cltv}, F.\mathrm{csv}, F.\mathrm{nulldummy})scriptFlagsOf(F)=(F.cltv,F.csv,F.nulldummy) and the signature-layer flags are sigFlagsOf(F)=(F.dersig,false,false,false)\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(F) = (F.\mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{false}, \mathrm{false}, \mathrm{false})sigFlagsOf(F)=(F.dersig,false,false,false), so under sigFlagsOf(F)\mathrm{sigFlagsOf}(F)sigFlagsOf(F) the public-key-encoding check always passes and the signature-encoding check only rejects non-empty, non-strict-DER signatures when F.dersigF.\mathrm{dersig}F.dersig is set.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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