Theorem 3.1 — every bilateral trade instance admits a stratification with Strat ≥ FB/(12e)
ProvedStratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction.theorem_3_1bilateral-tradegains-from-trademarket-stratificationp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
For every bilateral trade instance — independent value and cost , continuous distributions supported on — there is a market stratification (Definition 2.3), running the fixed-price mechanism within each submarket, whose gains from trade satisfy
where . This is the paper's bilateral headline result; Lemma 4.20 applies it to the super buyer and super seller.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: F and G are continuous distributions supported on [0, 1], v and c independent → a
BTInstance: probability measures μB, μS with no atoms (NullSingletonClass) and mass 1 on [0, 1]; expectations over the productμS.prod μB; reason: a CDF is continuous exactly when its law has no atoms; same instances - encoding: indices k = 1, …, N → 0-based
k : Fin N, submarket k is [m k.castSucc, m k.succ] with price p k; reason: relabelling only
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Bilateral import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Stratification open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
/-- Theorem 3.1 (p. 15): every bilateral trade instance admits a stratification, running the
fixed-price mechanism in each submarket, with `Strat ≥ FB / (12e)`. -/
theorem theorem_3_1 (I : BTInstance) :
∃ σ : Stratification, 1 / (12 * Real.exp 1) * I.FB ≤ I.strat σ := by sorry
end StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
Source
Deng, Lin, Schoepflin, Wang, Stratifying Markets for Efficient Trade, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 49372bcf…), p. 15, Theorem 3.1 (proof p. 23)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.