Sec. 5.1, p. 15 — under a standard buy-back the retailer's optimal refund is r* = b
ProvedSuReturns.Coordination.sec51_buyback_optimal_refundConsider a retailer under a standard buy-back contract with wholesale price and buy-back price , facing consumers with valuation law (finite mean) and nonnegative market demand . Its profit is (14),
where is expected sales under the demand rule (6) (consumers buy iff ). Then for every stock , the refund together with the price is optimal:
This is the observation that a standard buy-back distorts the retailer's returns policy: the supply chain's optimal refund is the salvage value , but the retailer's is the buy-back price , which differs from whenever the buy-back is used for coordination ().
Formalization Note The statement holds for every and , and for each fixed ; only the optimality of (with the matching price) is stated, not its uniqueness and not the paper's further remark that buy-backs fail to coordinate unless . Demand is assumed nonnegative () and stocks , as the paper's quantities are; without them the profit is unbounded.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_Coordination_Model open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
namespace SuReturns.Coordination
theorem sec51_buyback_optimal_refund (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
[IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
(w b : ℝ) :
∀ p r q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q →
retailerBuyback ν D w b p q r ≤ retailerBuyback ν D w b (SuReturns.PartialRefunds.reservationPrice ν b) q b := by sorry
end SuReturns.Coordination
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