(A2), proof of Proposition 2, p. 45 β a member hedges iff (A_CCP β I β F)π« β₯ (D β I β F) + X^g(I, F)
ProvedCCPCollateral.Incentive.eq_A2central-counterpartyincentive-compatibilitymoral-hazardp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Under the standing assumptions, for every number of other members who hedge and every collateral pair , a member weakly prefers hedging to risk-shifting,
if and only if
where is the member value (13), the loss-sharing cost (16) and the pledgeability.
This is the individual incentive constraint from which every equilibrium statement of Proposition 2 is derived.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CCPCollateral_Incentive_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CCPCollateral.Incentive
/-- (A2), proof of Proposition 2, Step 1 (p. 45): when `g` of the other members hedge, a member
weakly prefers hedging iff `(A_CCP β I β F) π« β₯ (D β I β F) + X^g(I, F)`. -/
theorem eq_A2 (m : Params) (hm : Standing m) :
β (g : β) (I F : β),
m.V Action.r g I F β€ m.V Action.s g I F β
m.D - I - F + m.X g I F β€ (m.Accp - I - F) * m.pledge := by sorry
end CCPCollateral.Incentive
Source
Wang, Capponi & Zhang, A Theory of Collateral Requirements for Central Counterparties, author's manuscript (2021; Management Sci. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4145), proof of Proposition 2, Step 1, (A2), p. 45
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.