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Proposition 5.2 — correlated equilibria of normalized harmonic games are characterized by equalities

Proved
HarmonicGames.UniformMixed.proposition_5_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryharmonic-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let GGG be a finite game with players M\mathcal MM, nonempty finite strategy sets EmE^mEm and utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​, and suppose GGG is a normalized harmonic game, i.e. u∈Hu \in \mathcal Hu∈H (Definition 4.2). Let x∈ΔEx \in \Delta Ex∈ΔE be a probability distribution on the set EEE of strategy profiles, and write x(pm,p−m)x(p^m, p^{-m})x(pm,p−m) for the probability of the profile (pm,p−m)(p^m, p^{-m})(pm,p−m). The following are equivalent:

  1. xxx is a correlated equilibrium: for all mmm and pm,qm∈Emp^m, q^m \in E^mpm,qm∈Em, ∑p−m(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m)) x(pm,p−m)≥0\sum_{p^{-m}} \big(u^m(p^m,p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\big)\, x(p^m,p^{-m}) \ge 0∑p−m​(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))x(pm,p−m)≥0 (Definition 5.1.2).
  2. For all m∈Mm \in \mathcal Mm∈M and pm,qm∈Emp^m, q^m \in E^mpm,qm∈Em,
∑p−m(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m)) x(pm,p−m)=0(36).\sum_{p^{-m}} \big(u^m(p^m,p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\big)\, x(p^m,p^{-m}) = 0 \qquad (36).p−m∑​(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))x(pm,p−m)=0(36).
  1. For all m∈Mm \in \mathcal Mm∈M and pm,qm∈Emp^m, q^m \in E^mpm,qm∈Em,
∑p−mum(qm,p−m) x(pm,p−m)=0(37).\sum_{p^{-m}} u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\, x(p^m,p^{-m}) = 0 \qquad (37).p−m∑​um(qm,p−m)x(pm,p−m)=0(37).

So in a normalized harmonic game the correlated equilibria are the points of the probability simplex lying in a linear subspace determined by the utilities.

Formalization Note Correlated equilibrium is the referenced HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq, which states Definition 5.1.2 with the sum over p−mp^{-m}p−m written as a sum over the profiles ppp with pmp^mpm fixed; the same convention is used for (36) and (37). The equivalence of the three conditions is stated as (i) ⇔ (ii) and (ii) ⇔ (iii).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Decomposition_Games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.UniformMixed

/-- **Proposition 5.2** (p. 25): let `u ∈ H` be a normalized harmonic game and `x ∈ ΔE` a
probability distribution on strategy profiles.  The following are equivalent:
(i) `x` is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 5.1.2);
(ii) for all `m` and `p^m, q^m ∈ E^m`,
`∑_{p^{-m}} (u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m, p^{-m})) x(p^m, p^{-m}) = 0` (36);
(iii) for all `m` and `p^m, q^m ∈ E^m`, `∑_{p^{-m}} u^m(q^m, p^{-m}) x(p^m, p^{-m}) = 0` (37).
Sums over `p^{-m}` are sums over the profiles `p` with `p m = a` (here `a = p^m`, `b = q^m`). -/
theorem proposition_5_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
    [∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
    (u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : u ∈ HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicSubspace E) (x : (∀ k, E k) → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsLottery x) :
    (HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x ↔
      ∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
        ∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
          (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m p - HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b)) * x p = 0) ∧
    ((∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
        ∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
          (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m p - HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b)) * x p = 0) ↔
      ∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
        ∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
          HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b) * x p = 0) := by sorry

end HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 25, Proposition 5.2, (36), (37)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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