Proposition 5.2 — correlated equilibria of normalized harmonic games are characterized by equalities
ProvedHarmonicGames.UniformMixed.proposition_5_2Let be a finite game with players , nonempty finite strategy sets and utilities , and suppose is a normalized harmonic game, i.e. (Definition 4.2). Let be a probability distribution on the set of strategy profiles, and write for the probability of the profile . The following are equivalent:
- is a correlated equilibrium: for all and , (Definition 5.1.2).
- For all and ,
- For all and ,
So in a normalized harmonic game the correlated equilibria are the points of the probability simplex lying in a linear subspace determined by the utilities.
Formalization Note Correlated equilibrium is the referenced HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq, which states Definition 5.1.2 with the sum over written as a sum over the profiles with fixed; the same convention is used for (36) and (37). The equivalence of the three conditions is stated as (i) ⇔ (ii) and (ii) ⇔ (iii).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Decomposition_Games import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games
namespace HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
/-- **Proposition 5.2** (p. 25): let `u ∈ H` be a normalized harmonic game and `x ∈ ΔE` a
probability distribution on strategy profiles. The following are equivalent:
(i) `x` is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 5.1.2);
(ii) for all `m` and `p^m, q^m ∈ E^m`,
`∑_{p^{-m}} (u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m, p^{-m})) x(p^m, p^{-m}) = 0` (36);
(iii) for all `m` and `p^m, q^m ∈ E^m`, `∑_{p^{-m}} u^m(q^m, p^{-m}) x(p^m, p^{-m}) = 0` (37).
Sums over `p^{-m}` are sums over the profiles `p` with `p m = a` (here `a = p^m`, `b = q^m`). -/
theorem proposition_5_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
[∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
(u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : u ∈ HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicSubspace E) (x : (∀ k, E k) → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsLottery x) :
(HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x ↔
∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
(HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m p - HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b)) * x p = 0) ∧
((∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
(HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m p - HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b)) * x p = 0) ↔
∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b) * x p = 0) := by sorry
end HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.