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Theorem 4.3 — Mod-Cut&Choose has a pure Nash equilibrium, and every one is MMS and EFX

Proved
StrategicAlloc.CutChoose.theorem_4_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

efxfair-divisionmaximin-sharemechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pure-nash-equilibrium

Let I=({1,2},M,v)\mathcal I=(\{1,2\},M,\mathbf v)I=({1,2},M,v) be any instance with two agents whose additive valuations v1,v2v_1,v_2v1​,v2​ are non-negative on the mmm goods of MMM, and let M\mathcal MM be the Mod-Cut&Choose mechanism (Mechanism 2). Then:

  1. M\mathcal MM has at least one pure Nash equilibrium: a bid profile b=(b1,b2)∈(R≥0m)2\mathbf b=(\mathbf b_1,\mathbf b_2)\in(\mathbb R^m_{\ge 0})^2b=(b1​,b2​)∈(R≥0m​)2 such that no agent iii has a bid bi′∈R≥0m\mathbf b'_i\in\mathbb R^m_{\ge 0}bi′​∈R≥0m​ with vi(M(bi′,b−i))>vi(M(b))v_i(\mathcal M(\mathbf b'_i,\mathbf b_{-i}))>v_i(\mathcal M(\mathbf b))vi​(M(bi′​,b−i​))>vi​(M(b));
  2. for every pure Nash equilibrium b\mathbf bb, the allocation A=M(b)\mathcal A=\mathcal M(\mathbf b)A=M(b) is MMS and EFX with respect to the true valuations:
vi(Ai) ≥ μi(i=1,2),A is EFX w.r.t. v1,v2.v_i(A_i)\ \ge\ \mu_i\quad (i=1,2),\qquad \mathcal A \text{ is EFX w.r.t. } v_1,v_2.vi​(Ai​) ≥ μi​(i=1,2),A is EFX w.r.t. v1​,v2​.

Here μi=μi(2,M)\mu_i=\mu_i(2,M)μi​=μi​(2,M) is agent iii's maximin share and EFX is Definition 2.1. Although Mod-Cut&Choose is not truthful, and as an algorithm it does not guarantee more than 5/65/65/6 of the maximin share, its equilibria are exactly as fair as one could ask for two agents.

Formalization Note Agents are 0 (agent 1) and 1 (agent 2). Deviations range over all non-negative bid vectors, and fairness is measured with the true valuations vvv, not with the bids. The mechanism sorts goods by agent 1's bid rather than by v1v_1v1​ as the page's line 2 says (a disclosed correction; see the Mod-Cut&Choose definition).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LittleCharity_MMS_Setting
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_CutChoose_Setting
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_CutChoose_ModCutChoose
Formal statement
namespace StrategicAlloc.CutChoose

/-- Theorem 4.3 (p. 18): for every two-agent instance with additive non-negative valuations,
Mod-Cut&Choose has a pure Nash equilibrium, and every pure Nash equilibrium yields an allocation
that is MMS and EFX with respect to the true valuations `v_1, v_2`. -/
theorem theorem_4_3 {m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i g, 0 ≤ v i g) :
    (∃ b, StrategicAlloc.RRFair.IsPNE modCutChoose v b) ∧
      ∀ b, StrategicAlloc.RRFair.IsPNE modCutChoose v b →
        IsApproxMMS 1 v (modCutChoose b) ∧ IsEFX v (modCutChoose b) := by sorry

end StrategicAlloc.CutChoose
Source
Amanatidis et al., Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents, arXiv:2109.08644v2, p. 18, Theorem 4.3
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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