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Theorem 5.9 — changing only the nonstrategic component makes the pure Nash equilibria coincide with the Pareto optimal profiles

Proved
HarmonicGames.Pareto.theorem_5_9

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theoryharmonic-gamesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pareto-optimality

Let GGG be a finite game with players M\mathcal MM, nonempty finite strategy sets EmE^mEm and utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​, and assume that GGG has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Then there exists a game Gˉ\bar GGˉ with utilities uˉ=(uˉm)m\bar u = (\bar u^m)_muˉ=(uˉm)m​ such that

  1. the potential and harmonic components of Gˉ\bar GGˉ are identical to those of GGG:
D†δ0δ0†Duˉ=D†δ0δ0†Du,D†(I−δ0δ0†)Duˉ=D†(I−δ0δ0†)Du;D^\dagger \delta_0 \delta_0^\dagger D \bar u = D^\dagger \delta_0 \delta_0^\dagger D u, \qquad D^\dagger (I - \delta_0 \delta_0^\dagger) D \bar u = D^\dagger (I - \delta_0 \delta_0^\dagger) D u ;D†δ0​δ0†​Duˉ=D†δ0​δ0†​Du,D†(I−δ0​δ0†​)Duˉ=D†(I−δ0​δ0†​)Du;
  1. in Gˉ\bar GGˉ the set of pure Nash equilibria coincides with the set of Pareto optimal strategy profiles: for every profile ppp,
p is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gˉ  ⟺  p is Pareto optimal in Gˉ.p \text{ is a pure Nash equilibrium of } \bar G \iff p \text{ is Pareto optimal in } \bar G .p is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gˉ⟺p is Pareto optimal in Gˉ.

The paper leaves implicit that GGG has a pure Nash equilibrium. The hypothesis is necessary: a finite game always has a Pareto optimal profile (a maximiser of ∑mum\sum_m u^m∑m​um), while a game with no pure Nash equilibrium (matching pennies) has none in any game with the same potential and harmonic components, since those components determine the pairwise comparisons; so condition 2 cannot hold. The paper's proof uses an equilibrium when it argues that "deviation to a NE increases the payoff of at least one player".

The theorem shows that the nonstrategic component, which has no effect on equilibria, fully controls their efficiency: it can always be chosen so that the equilibria are exactly the Pareto optimal profiles.

Formalization Note Pure Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsPureNash (condition (1)), Pareto optimality is Definition 5.3, both applied to payoff E ū. The components are the maps of Theorem 4.1 with pseudoinverses for the unweighted inner product on games. Condition 2 is an equivalence, not one inclusion.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Pareto_Games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Pareto_IsParetoOptimal
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.Pareto

/-- **Theorem 5.9** (p. 32). Let `u` be a game that has a pure Nash equilibrium (the paper
leaves this hypothesis implicit; without it the statement fails, e.g. for matching pennies).
Then there is a game `ū` with (i) the same potential and harmonic components as `u` and (ii) in
`ū` a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium iff it is Pareto optimal. -/
theorem theorem_5_9 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
    [∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
    (u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hNE : ∃ p : ∀ m, E m, AGT.IsPureNash (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) p) :
    ∃ ū : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E, HarmonicGames.Decomposition.potentialComponent E ū = HarmonicGames.Decomposition.potentialComponent E u ∧
      HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicComponent E ū = HarmonicGames.Decomposition.harmonicComponent E u ∧
      ∀ p : ∀ m, E m, AGT.IsPureNash (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E ū) p ↔ IsParetoOptimal (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E ū) p := by sorry

end HarmonicGames.Pareto
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 32, Theorem 5.9
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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