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The message-dependent intermediary model and RandMD\mathrm{RandMD}RandMD

Definition
LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_MessageDependent

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

In the message-dependent model (§2.1) the intermediary's auction may depend on the menu option a bidder asks for. By the revelation principle it is a direct mechanism: for each report profile vvv and bidder iii it specifies the probability yi(v)≥0y_i(v)\ge0yi​(v)≥0 that iii is forwarded, with ∑iyi(v)≤1\sum_i y_i(v)\le1∑i​yi​(v)≤1; the probability Xi(v)X_i(v)Xi​(v) that iii receives the item and expected payment Pi(v)P_i(v)Pi​(v) to the seller, with

(Xi(v),Pi(v))=yi(v) ofor some o∈conv⁡O,(X_i(v),P_i(v))=y_i(v)\,o\quad\text{for some } o\in\operatorname{conv}\mathcal O ,(Xi​(v),Pi​(v))=yi​(v)ofor some o∈convO,

so the forwarded option may be a lottery over menu options; and an expected fee qi(v)q_i(v)qi​(v) to the intermediary. Bidder iii of type ttt reporting t′t't′ has interim utility Xˉi(t′) t−Pˉi(t′)−qˉi(t′)\bar X_i(t')\,t-\bar P_i(t')-\bar q_i(t')Xˉi​(t′)t−Pˉi​(t′)−qˉ​i​(t′). Admissibility requires measurability, integrability, Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality.

A best response is an admissible mechanism maximizing the expected fee revenue E[∑iqi]\mathbb E[\sum_i q_i]E[∑i​qi​]. The seller's revenue from it is E[∑iPi]\mathbb E[\sum_i P_i]E[∑i​Pi​], and

RandMD(O)=inf⁡{seller revenue of a best response},\mathrm{RandMD}(\mathcal O)=\inf\{\text{seller revenue of a best response}\},RandMD(O)=inf{seller revenue of a best response},

with value −∞-\infty−∞ when no best response exists, the convention of the published RandMI\mathrm{RandMI}RandMI (ties against the seller, Assumption 3.2).

These definitions are used by Theorem 5.1.

Formalization Note Per-bidder pairs in yi⋅conv⁡Oy_i\cdot\operatorname{conv}\mathcal Oyi​⋅convO represent the forwarding lotteries: the mean of a lottery over options lies in the convex hull of the options, and every hull point is the mean of a finite lottery.

Definition code
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Supplement_GeneralMenu

open MeasureTheory

namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- A direct mechanism of the intermediary in the message-dependent model (§2.1).
For a report profile `v` and bidder `i`: `selection v i` is the probability that `i`
is forwarded; `allocation v i` and `sellerPayment v i` are `i`'s probability of
receiving the item and expected payment to the seller, through the menu option the
intermediary forwards (which may depend on the reports); `fee v i` is `i`'s expected
payment to the intermediary. -/
structure MDMechanism (n : ℕ) where
  selection : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
  allocation : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
  sellerPayment : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ
  fee : (Fin n → ℝ) → Fin n → ℝ

/-- At most one bidder is forwarded, and the forwarded bidder's (allocation, seller
payment) is the selection probability times a lottery over menu options: a point of
the convex hull of the options (randomization over options is allowed). -/
def MDFeasible {n : ℕ} (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  (∀ v i, 0 ≤ M.selection v i) ∧
  (∀ v, (∑ i, M.selection v i) ≤ 1) ∧
  (∀ v i, ∃ o ∈ convexHull ℝ O.options,
    M.allocation v i = M.selection v i * o.1 ∧ M.sellerPayment v i = M.selection v i * o.2)

def MDWellDefined {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  (∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.selection v i)) ∧
  (∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.allocation v i)) ∧
  (∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.sellerPayment v i)) ∧
  (∀ i, Measurable (fun v => M.fee v i)) ∧
  (∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.allocation v i) μ) ∧
  (∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.sellerPayment v i) μ) ∧
  (∀ i, Integrable (fun v => M.fee v i) μ) ∧
  (∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.allocation (Function.update v i t) i) μ) ∧
  (∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.sellerPayment (Function.update v i t) i) μ) ∧
  (∀ i t, Integrable (fun v => M.fee (Function.update v i t) i) μ)

/-- Interim utility of bidder `i` with true value `t` who reports `report`. -/
noncomputable def mdInterimUtility {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n)
    (i : Fin n) (report t : ℝ) : ℝ :=
  (∫ v, M.allocation (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ) * t
    - (∫ v, M.sellerPayment (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ)
    - (∫ v, M.fee (Function.update v i report) i ∂μ)

def MDBIC {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  ∀ i, ∀ᵐ t ∂(D i).law, ∀ report : ℝ,
    mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i report t ≤ mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i t t

def MDInterimIR {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  ∀ i, ∀ᵐ t ∂(D i).law, 0 ≤ mdInterimUtility (prior D) M i t t

def MDAdmissible {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  MDFeasible O M ∧ MDWellDefined (prior D) M ∧ MDBIC D M ∧ MDInterimIR D M

/-- Expected fee revenue of the intermediary. -/
noncomputable def mdFeeRevenue {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : ℝ :=
  ∫ v, ∑ i, M.fee v i ∂μ

/-- Expected revenue of the seller. -/
noncomputable def mdSellerRevenue {n : ℕ} (μ : Measure (Fin n → ℝ)) (M : MDMechanism n) : ℝ :=
  ∫ v, ∑ i, M.sellerPayment v i ∂μ

noncomputable def mdOptFee {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) : EReal :=
  sSup {r | ∃ M : MDMechanism n, MDAdmissible D O M ∧ (mdFeeRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = r}

def MDBestResponse {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) (M : MDMechanism n) : Prop :=
  MDAdmissible D O M ∧ (mdFeeRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = mdOptFee D O

/-- `RandMD(O)`: the seller's revenue against the worst intermediary best response,
`⊥` if there is none (the convention of the published `RandMI`). -/
noncomputable def RandMD {n : ℕ} (D : Fin n → ValueDist) (O : GenMenu) : EReal := by
  classical
  exact if ∃ M, MDBestResponse D O M then
    sInf {r | ∃ M, MDBestResponse D O M ∧ (mdSellerRevenue (prior D) M : EReal) = r}
  else ⊥

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), §2.1, pp.7–8 (PDF pp.8–9); §5, Lemma 5.2 and its proof, pp.15–16 (PDF pp.16–17); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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