Theorem 4 — every game in graph function form has a unique fair allocation rule
ProvedCooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_4cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a game in graph function form on a finite player set : for every graph on and every connected component , is a closed, comprehensive, proper subset of . Then there is a unique function satisfying the efficiency condition
and the equity condition
This is the non-transferable-utility generalization of Theorem 1: a characteristic function game is the graph function game .
Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as . is the topological frontier in = ↥S → ℝ. Uniqueness is among all functions ; condition (7) is not imposed (it is replaced by (14)). The paper's is nonempty; for the statement holds trivially, so no nonemptiness hypothesis is needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule
open Finset
open scoped Classical
/-- Theorem 4 (p. 10): every game `w` in graph function form has a unique fair allocation rule
`Y : GR → ℝ^N`, i.e. a unique `Y` satisfying the efficiency condition (14) and the equity
condition (10). -/
theorem theorem_4 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (G : GraphFunctionGame n) :
∃! Y : Rule n, IsEfficientGF G Y ∧ IsEquitable Y := by sorry
end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), Theorem 4, p. 10
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.