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Lemma 7 — smoothing atoms preserves interim allocations: xi(b)=x~i(b~)x_i(b)=\tilde x_i(\tilde b)xi​(b)=x~i​(b~), and xi(b)=E[x~i(b~)]x_i(b)=\mathbb E[\tilde x_i(\tilde b)]xi​(b)=E[x~i​(b~)] at atoms

Proved
LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.lemma_7

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Consider a kkk-unit first-price auction with nnn agents, value laws VVV and strategy profile EEE. Let ω>0\omega>0ω>0 and weights sp>0s_p>0sp​>0 (p∈Pp\in\mathcal Pp∈P, the atoms of the marginal bid distributions) with ∑p∈Psp<ω\sum_{p\in\mathcal P}s_p<\omega∑p∈P​sp​<ω. Let x~i\tilde x_ix~i​ be the interim allocation when every agent's bid bbb is replaced by the smoothed bid b~\tilde bb~ of (37)–(38). Then for every agent iii and every bid b≥0b\ge0b≥0:

(i) if b∉Pb\notin\mathcal Pb∈/P, then xi(b)=x~i(b+∑p∈P, p<bsp)x_i(b)=\tilde x_i\big(b+\sum_{p\in\mathcal P,\,p<b}s_p\big)xi​(b)=x~i​(b+∑p∈P,p<b​sp​);

(ii) if b∈Pb\in\mathcal Pb∈P, then

xi(b)=∫01x~i(b+∑p∈P, p<bsp+sb u) du=E[x~i(b~)].x_i(b)=\int_0^1\tilde x_i\Big(b+\sum_{p\in\mathcal P,\,p<b}s_p+s_b\,u\Big)\,du=\mathbb E\big[\tilde x_i(\tilde b)\big].xi​(b)=∫01​x~i​(b+p∈P,p<b∑​sp​+sb​u)du=E[x~i​(b~)].

This is the key step of Theorem 3(c). The cumulative shifts keep the order of bids, and the uniform jitter at an atom reproduces uniform tie-breaking.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
  • generalization: the construction starts from an ϵ-approximate equilibrium E → any strategy profile E; reason: Lemma 7 concerns allocation probabilities only and its proof uses no equilibrium property; the printed setting is the special case
  • encoding: x_i(b_i) = E[x̃_i(b̃_i)] for the random bid b̃_i of (38) → x_i(b) = ∫_{[0,1]} x̃_i(b + shift(b) + s_b u) du; reason: the expectation over U ∼ U[0,1] written as a Lebesgue integral
  • encoding: bid b_i ∈ ℝ≥0; weights s_p ∈ ℝ>0 for p ∈ P with ∑ s_p < ω → b : ℝ with 0 ≤ b; s : ℝ → ℝ positive on P, summable over P, ∑' < ω; reason: Lean types; values of s off P are irrelevant
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Smoothing

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic

theorem lemma_7 {n : ℕ} (k : ℕ) (V : Fin n → Measure ℝ) (E : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ)
    (hV : IsValueProfile V) (hE : IsStrategyProfile E)
    (ω : ℝ) (hω : 0 < ω) (s : ℝ → ℝ) (hs : IsSmoothingWeights V E ω s)
    (i : Fin n) (b : ℝ) (hb : 0 ≤ b) :
    (b ∉ atomSet V E →
      alloc k V E i b = smoothedAlloc k V E s i (b + atomShift V E s b)) ∧
    (b ∈ atomSet V E →
      alloc k V E i b =
        ∫ u in Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, smoothedAlloc k V E s i (b + atomShift V E s b + s b * u)) := by sorry

end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 30, Lemma 7 (construction (37)–(38) p. 29; proof pp. 31–32)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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