Proof of Theorem 2, p. 13 — satisfies the equity condition (10)
ProvedCooperationGraphs.FairRule.shapley_restrict_isEquitablecooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1shapley-value
Let and let be the Shapley value. For every graph on and every link ,
that is, the rule satisfies the equity condition (10).
Together with the efficiency on components, this shows that is a fair allocation rule, which by the uniqueness in Theorem 1 gives Theorem 2.
Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as . Stated as IsEquitable (fun g => φ(v/g)), whose unfolding is the displayed identity rearranged: .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule
open Finset
open scoped Classical
/-- Proof of Theorem 2, p. 13: the rule `g ↦ φ(v/g)` satisfies the equity condition (10):
`φ_a(v/g) − φ_b(v/g) = φ_a(v/(g \ a,b)) − φ_b(v/(g \ a,b))` for every link `a,b ∈ g`. -/
theorem shapley_restrict_isEquitable {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) :
IsEquitable (fun g => shapley (restrict v g)) := by sorry
end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), proof of Theorem 2, p. 13
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.