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Remark after Proposition 5.2 — (i) ⇔ (ii) holds for all harmonic games

Proved
HarmonicGames.UniformMixed.remark_5_2_all_harmonic

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryharmonic-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let GGG be a finite game with players M\mathcal MM, nonempty finite strategy sets EmE^mEm and utilities u=(um)mu = (u^m)_mu=(um)m​, and suppose GGG is a harmonic game, u∈H⊕Nu \in \mathcal H \oplus \mathcal Nu∈H⊕N (not necessarily normalized). Let x∈ΔEx \in \Delta Ex∈ΔE be a probability distribution on strategy profiles. Then xxx is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 5.1.2) if and only if, for all m∈Mm \in \mathcal Mm∈M and pm,qm∈Emp^m, q^m \in E^mpm,qm∈Em,

∑p−m(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m)) x(pm,p−m)=0(36).\sum_{p^{-m}} \big(u^m(p^m,p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m,p^{-m})\big)\, x(p^m,p^{-m}) = 0 \qquad (36).p−m∑​(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))x(pm,p−m)=0(36).

The paper observes this after the proof of Proposition 5.2, whose normalization hypothesis is used only for the equivalence with (37). It is the form used in Corollary 5.2.

Formalization Note Correlated equilibrium is the referenced HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq; sums over p−mp^{-m}p−m are sums over the profiles with pmp^mpm fixed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_Decomposition_Games
import Definitions.Def_HarmonicGames_GenericPure_Games
Formal statement
namespace HarmonicGames.UniformMixed

/-- **Remark after Proposition 5.2** (§5.2.2, p. 26): for every harmonic game `u ∈ H ⊕ N`
(not necessarily normalized) and every probability distribution `x ∈ ΔE`, `x` is a
correlated equilibrium if and only if, for all `m` and `p^m, q^m ∈ E^m`,
`∑_{p^{-m}} (u^m(p^m, p^{-m}) - u^m(q^m, p^{-m})) x(p^m, p^{-m}) = 0` (36). -/
theorem remark_5_2_all_harmonic {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (E : ι → Type)
    [∀ m, Fintype (E m)] [∀ m, DecidableEq (E m)] [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)]
    (u : HarmonicGames.Decomposition.Games E) (hu : u ∈ HarmonicGames.GenericPure.harmonicGames E) (x : (∀ k, E k) → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsLottery x) :
    HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u) x ↔
      ∀ (m : ι) (a b : E m),
        ∑ p ∈ Finset.univ.filter (fun p : ∀ k, E k => p m = a),
          (HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m p - HarmonicGames.GenericPure.payoff E u m (Function.update p m b)) * x p = 0 := by sorry

end HarmonicGames.UniformMixed
Source
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, p. 26, Section 5.2.2, remark following the proof of Proposition 5.2 (unnumbered)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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