Eq. (5), p. 49 — given first-period buyers v ≥ w with c ≤ w ≤ 1, the optimal second-period basic price is (w − c)/2
ProvedGDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark.eq5_second_period_priceConsider the benchmark model, under the standing assumptions , , . Fix a strategy profile and a first-period price . Suppose the first-period buyers at are exactly the consumers with , for some threshold with
In period 2 a first-period non-buyer buys the basic good at price iff . Then the firm's second-period profit is maximized over all real at
This is eq. (5): .
Together with eq. (6) it pins down the fixed point between the consumers' first-period threshold and the firm's second-period price.
Formalization Note. The second-period profit is the integral of the personalized revenue over the first-period buyers plus times the Lebesgue measure of the set of non-buyers who buy the basic good. The paper writes this mass as , which is wrong for . The theorem compares the true profits for every real . The hypothesis is the paper's ""; is its standing assumption of that regime ().
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Model
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
theorem eq5_second_period_price (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) (σ : Profile) (p1 w : ℝ)
(hthr : ∀ v ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, (σ.buy p1 v = true ↔ w ≤ v))
(hcw : P.c ≤ w) (hw1 : w ≤ 1) :
∀ q : ℝ, profit2 P σ p1 q ≤ profit2 P σ p1 ((w - P.c) / 2) := by sorry
end GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.