Proposition 2 (Double Marginalization): publisher and advertisers both earn less in the auction of auctions
ProvedAuctionsOfAuctions.proposition_2auctionsfirst-price-auctionintermediationmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1reserve-price
Let be a regular valuation distribution on . Let maximize the direct-benchmark revenue of (4) over , and let maximize the auction-of-auctions revenue of (18) over . Then
where is the advertiser's expected profit (5), which by (16) is the advertiser's profit in either arrangement at the reserve the publisher sets there.
When advertisers bid through competing exchanges that run their own first-price auctions, both the publisher and the advertisers are worse off than under direct bidding, even though the allocation stays efficient at any fixed reserve.
Differences from the source:
- reading: valuations drawn iid from a distribution with support (p.7) → , with continuous on , on , on and ; reason: the paper writes , divides by for and differentiates its revenue integrals in (A18), which uses a continuous density; and are allowed
- encoding: Stieltjes integrals in (3), (4), (5), (13), (18) → (interval integrals); reason: is absolutely continuous with density ; same instances
- generalization: regular: "is increasing" (p.7) → weakly increasing on (MonotoneOn); reason: weak monotonicity is Myerson's regularity; the strict reading is a special case, and is defined where
- encoding: a reserve price → ; reason: valuations lie in : a reserve below acts as and a reserve above sells nothing, so the publisher's choice set is
- generalization: the optimal reserve price and , written as if unique → every maximizer on of the transcribed revenue (IsMaxOn); no uniqueness, interiority or first-order condition assumed; reason: when the maximizer is unique this is the paper's statement; under weak regularity maximizers need not be unique
- reading: "the expected profits of the advertisers and the publisher are lower in the auction of auctions arrangement" → both strict inequalities and , with the advertisers' profit in the auction of auctions given by (5) at ; reason: strict, as in (20) and the proof A1.7; (16) states that the advertiser's profit is the same function (5) of the reserve in every arrangement, and the per-advertiser profit is a quarter of the advertisers' total
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AuctionsOfAuctions_Model
Formal statement
namespace AuctionsOfAuctions
/-- **Proposition 2 (Double Marginalization)**, Zeithammer–Choi, *Auctions of Auctions*,
Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.3, p.20 (PDF 21): "The expected
profits of the advertisers and the publisher are lower in the auction of auctions arrangement than
in the direct market arrangement."
For a regular valuation distribution, every maximizer `R^dir` of the direct revenue `π^dir_P` (4)
and every maximizer `R^ex` of the auction-of-auctions revenue `π^ex_P` (18) over `[0, 1]` satisfy
`π^ex_P(R^ex) < π^dir_P(R^dir)` and `π_C(R^ex) < π_C(R^dir)`, where `π_C` is the advertiser's
expected profit (5), which by (16) is the advertiser's profit in either arrangement.
**Formalization Note.** Optimal reserves are arbitrary maximizers (`IsMaxOn`) of the transcribed
revenues; neither uniqueness nor a first-order condition is assumed. -/
theorem proposition_2 (D : ValuationDist) (hreg : D.IsRegular) (Rd Re : ℝ)
(hRd : Rd ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hRe : Re ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hmaxd : IsMaxOn D.revDir (Set.Icc 0 1) Rd) (hmaxe : IsMaxOn D.revEx (Set.Icc 0 1) Re) :
D.revEx Re < D.revDir Rd ∧ D.advertiserProfit Re < D.advertiserProfit Rd := by sorry
end AuctionsOfAuctions
Source
Zeithammer–Choi, Auctions of Auctions, Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.3, Proposition 2, p.20 (PDF 21); eq. (20), p.19; proof A1.7, p.41 (PDF 42)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.