Eqs. (3)–(6), pp. 11–13 — at the four candidate price pairs, profit (2) equals the printed objectives (3)–(6)
ProvedDynOpaque.TwoPeriod.objectives_3_to_6opaque-sellingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1probabilistic-selling
Assume the standing assumptions , , , , and let be real numbers. Write for the profit (2) computed from the one-anecdote purchase rule. Then
These identities are how §4 rewrites the firm's problem (2) for each of the four candidate price pairs; Lemmas 2–4 and the claim after (6) then optimize the right-hand sides.
Formalization Note The right-hand sides are separate definitions written literally from the page, so the identities are not true by definition.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DynOpaque_TwoPeriod_Model
Formal statement
namespace DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
/-- Displays (3)–(6), pp. 11–13: at the four candidate price pairs, profit (2) is the
objective printed for that pair. -/
theorem objectives_3_to_6 (vH vL cH cL α : ℝ) (hS : Standing vH vL cH cL α) (ξ₁ ξ₂ : ℝ) :
opaqueProfit vH vL cH cL α (vHL vH vL) (vHL vH vL) ξ₁ ξ₂ = obj3 vH vL cH cL α ξ₁ ξ₂ ∧
opaqueProfit vH vL cH cL α (vHL vH vL) vL ξ₁ ξ₂ = obj4 vH vL cH cL ξ₁ ξ₂ ∧
opaqueProfit vH vL cH cL α vL (vHL vH vL) ξ₁ ξ₂ = obj5 vH vL cH cL α ξ₁ ξ₂ ∧
opaqueProfit vH vL cH cL α vL vL ξ₁ ξ₂ = obj6 vL cH cL ξ₁ ξ₂ := by sorry
end DynOpaque.TwoPeriod
Source
Huang and Yin, Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations, SSRN manuscript 3627927, pp. 11–13, eqs. (3), (4), (5), (6)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.