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Proposition 5.3 -- with lottery outcomes, q is implementable iff q(θ) is a subgradient of a convex U

Proved
MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat.lottery_subgradient

by mikedeng1 · Oct 3, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

convex-analysisincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-b23bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1subgradient

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a finite set of outcomes and let the alternatives be all lotteries p∈Δ(Ω)={p∈RΩ:pℓ≥0, ∑ℓpℓ=1}p \in \Delta(\Omega) = \{p \in \mathbb R^\Omega : p_\ell \ge 0,\ \sum_\ell p_\ell = 1\}p∈Δ(Ω)={p∈RΩ:pℓ​≥0, ∑ℓ​pℓ​=1}. Let the type set Θ⊆RΩ\Theta \subseteq \mathbb R^\OmegaΘ⊆RΩ be a nonempty convex set of vectors of Bernoulli utilities, and let the utility of lottery ppp for type θ\thetaθ be the expected utility p⋅θ=∑ℓpℓθℓp\cdot\theta = \sum_{\ell} p_\ell\theta_\ellp⋅θ=∑ℓ​pℓ​θℓ​. Then a decision rule q:Θ→Δ(Ω)q : \Theta \to \Delta(\Omega)q:Θ→Δ(Ω) is implementable if and only if there is a function U:Θ→RU : \Theta \to \mathbb RU:Θ→R, convex on Θ\ThetaΘ, such that for every θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ the vector q(θ)q(\theta)q(θ) is a subgradient of UUU at θ\thetaθ:

U(θ′)  ≥  U(θ)+q(θ)⋅(θ′−θ)for all θ′∈Θ.U(\theta') \;\ge\; U(\theta) + q(\theta)\cdot(\theta' - \theta)\qquad\text{for all } \theta' \in \Theta.U(θ′)≥U(θ)+q(θ)⋅(θ′−θ)for all θ′∈Θ.

This is the lottery case of Rochet's theorem in the language of convex analysis.

Formalization Note The page writes "U:θ→RU : \theta \to \mathbb RU:θ→R"; the intended domain is the type set Θ\ThetaΘ. In Lean U is a function on RΩ\mathbb R^\OmegaRΩ of which only the values on Θ\ThetaΘ matter (convexity and the subgradient inequality are both relative to Θ\ThetaΘ). Θ is the subtype of a set S; nonemptiness is the standing assumption of §5.2.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_IncentiveCompat_Model
Formal statement
namespace MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat

/-- Proposition 5.3 (p.103). Alternatives are the lotteries `Δ(Ω)` over a finite outcome set
`Ω`; types are the vectors `θ ∈ S ⊆ ℝ^Ω` of Bernoulli utilities, `S` nonempty and convex; the
utility of lottery `p` for type `θ` is `p · θ`. Then `q` is implementable if and only if there
is a function `U`, convex on `S`, such that `q(θ)` is a subgradient of `U` at `θ` (relative
to `S`) for every `θ ∈ S`. -/
theorem lottery_subgradient {Ω : Type*} [Fintype Ω] (S : Set (Ω → ℝ)) (hS : Convex ℝ S)
    (hSne : S.Nonempty) (q : S → stdSimplex ℝ Ω) :
    Implementable (fun (p : stdSimplex ℝ Ω) (θ : S) => lotteryUtility p (θ : Ω → ℝ)) q ↔
      ∃ U : (Ω → ℝ) → ℝ, ConvexOn ℝ S U ∧
        ∀ θ : S, IsSubgradientOn S U (θ : Ω → ℝ) ((q θ : stdSimplex ℝ Ω) : Ω → ℝ) := by sorry

end MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
Source
Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001, p.103, Proposition 5.3
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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