Lemma 10 (cyclic consistency), p. 42 — around a cycle of minimal positive-share coalitions, ∏ f^{j,T_j}(i_j, T_j) = ∏ f^{j,T_j}(i_{j+1}, T_j)
ProvedCostSharingPNE.Char.lemma_10Let be an integer and local welfare functions on , . Let () be corresponding budget-balanced distribution rules, vanishing off the sharing coalition, that guarantee equilibrium existence in all games , where are the basis rules (27). Let be players such that there are coalitions
where is the set of coalitions of in which or gets a positive basis share (53). Then
Lemma 9 compares two coalitions; this lemma rules out inconsistent cycles of length three or more, which is what allows a single weight system to be assembled.
Formalization Note Indices are cyclic: player is p (finRotate k l), so the last coalition pairs with . The players need not be distinct and the welfare functions may repeat. The convention off is the hypothesis h0.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_Setting import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_WeightSystem import Definitions.Def_CostSharingPNE_Char_Basis
namespace CostSharingPNE.Char
theorem lemma_10 (n : ℕ) (hn : 1 < n) (k : ℕ) (hk : 3 ≤ k) (W : Fin k → Welfare n)
(f : Welfare n → Rule n)
(hbb : ∀ l, IsBudgetBalanced (f (W l)) (W l))
(h0 : ∀ l i S, i ∉ S → f (W l) i S = 0)
(hpne : GuaranteesPNE (Set.range W) f)
(p : Fin k → Fin n) (T : Fin k → Finset (Fin n))
(hT : ∀ l, T l ∈ minimals (plusPair (f (W l)) (W l) (p l) (p (finRotate k l)))) :
∏ l, basisRule (f (W l)) (W l) (T l) (p l) (T l) =
∏ l, basisRule (f (W l)) (W l) (T l) (p (finRotate k l)) (T l) := by sorry
end CostSharingPNE.Char
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.