Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

§4, p. 31 — Pareto optimality implies citizens' sovereignty

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.cs_of_po

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

arrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1paretosocial-choice

Let n≥2n\ge2n≥2, m≥3m\ge3m≥3, and let u:ρmn→ρmu:\rho_m^n\to\rho_mu:ρmn​→ρm​ be a strict social welfare function on the committee InI_nIn​ and the alternative set SmS_mSm​. If uuu satisfies Pareto optimality (PO), then it satisfies citizens' sovereignty (CS): for all distinct x,y∈Smx,y\in S_mx,y∈Sm​ there is a strict ballot set BBB with

x Aˉ y,A=u(B).x\,\bar A\,y,\qquad A=u(B).xAˉy,A=u(B).

The paper uses this observation to conclude that the social welfare function Gibbard builds from a strategy-proof voting procedure, which is Pareto optimal, also satisfies CS.

Formalization Note The paper's observation carries no cardinality conditions; the standing hypotheses n≥2n\ge2n≥2, m≥3m\ge3m≥3 of §4 are kept. CS is read for x≠yx\ne yx=y. Definitions as in StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.Basic.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence

theorem cs_of_po {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hpo : PO u) :
    CS u := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), §4, p. 31 ("Observe that if a social welfare function satisfies PO, then it also satisfies CS"), used p. 33
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me