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Theorem 2 — strict strategy-proof voting procedures with full range correspond one-to-one to strict SWFs with CS, NNR, IIA

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.theorem_2

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

arrowgibbard-satterthwaitep2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness

Let InI_nIn​ be a committee of n≥2n\ge2n≥2 individuals and SmS_mSm​ a set of m≥3m\ge3m≥3 alternatives. There is a one-to-one correspondence λ\lambdaλ between

  • the strict voting procedures v:ρmn→Smv:\rho_m^n\to S_mv:ρmn​→Sm​ that are strategy-proof and have range Tp=SmT_p=S_mTp​=Sm​, and
  • the strict social welfare functions u:ρmn→ρmu:\rho_m^n\to\rho_mu:ρmn​→ρm​ that satisfy citizens' sovereignty, non-negative response and independence of irrelevant alternatives,

such that, whenever u=λ(v)u=\lambda(v)u=λ(v), uuu underlies vvv and vvv is derived from uuu:

ΨSm[λ(v)(B)]={v(B)}for every B∈ρmn.\Psi_{S_m}[\lambda(v)(B)]=\{v(B)\}\qquad\text{for every } B\in\rho_m^n.ΨSm​​[λ(v)(B)]={v(B)}for every B∈ρmn​.

The theorem says that, for strict preferences, strategy-proofness of a voting procedure is equivalent to Arrow's conditions on the social welfare function underlying it, independently of the fact that each set of conditions forces dictatorship.

Formalization Note λ\lambdaλ is a Lean Equiv between the two subtypes, together with the condition that λ(v)\lambda(v)λ(v) underlies vvv for every vvv; "underlies" and "derived from" are the same relation (Underlies). A bare bijection would be a cardinality statement and lose the content. Procedures and social welfare functions are functions on strict ballot sets only (a subtype), so two of them are equal iff they agree on every admissible ballot set. CS is read for x≠yx\ne yx=y, NNR for every xxx; the range is taken over strict ballot sets.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence

theorem theorem_2 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
:
    ∃ lam : {v : StrongProfile ι A → A // StrategyProof v ∧ Set.range v = Set.univ} ≃
        {u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A // CS u ∧ NNR u ∧ IIA u},
      ∀ v, Underlies (lam v).1 v.1 := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Theorem 2, p. 35
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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