Proposition 5.8 -- revenue equivalence on convex type spaces: transfers are unique up to a constant
ProvedMechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat.revenue_equivalenceLet the type set be a nonempty convex subset of , let be a set of alternatives, and suppose that for every the utility is a convex function of on that is also continuous on . Let be an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. Then a direct mechanism with the same decision rule is incentive-compatible if and only if there is with
For a given implementable decision rule, the set of transfer rules that implement it is one function and all its parallel translations (Krishna and Maenner 2001).
Formalization Note Continuity of on is added to the book's hypotheses; a convex function on a convex set is automatically continuous only on its relative interior, and without continuity at the boundary the statement is false. Example: , , , for , , and for ; both and make incentive-compatible. Every utility convex on an open convex set containing (for instance, the linear expected utility of lotteries) satisfies the added hypothesis.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MechanismDesign_IncentiveCompat_Model
namespace MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
/-- Proposition 5.8 (Krishna–Maenner 2001; p.109), in the corrected form. Types form a nonempty
convex set `S ⊆ ℝⁿ`; for each alternative `a` the utility `w a` is convex on `S` and, in addition
to the book's hypotheses, continuous on `S` (without continuity at the relative boundary the
statement is false). If `(q, t)` is incentive-compatible, then `(q, t')` is incentive-compatible
if and only if `t' = t + τ` on `S` for some constant `τ`. -/
theorem revenue_equivalence {A : Type*} {n : ℕ} (S : Set (Fin n → ℝ)) (hS : Convex ℝ S)
(hSne : S.Nonempty) (w : A → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) (hconv : ∀ a, ConvexOn ℝ S (w a))
(hcont : ∀ a, ContinuousOn (w a) S) (q : S → A) (t : S → ℝ)
(hIC : IsIC (fun (a : A) (θ : S) => w a (θ : Fin n → ℝ)) ⟨q, t⟩) (t' : S → ℝ) :
IsIC (fun (a : A) (θ : S) => w a (θ : Fin n → ℝ)) ⟨q, t'⟩ ↔
∃ τ : ℝ, ∀ θ : S, t' θ = t θ + τ := by sorry
end MechanismDesign.IncentiveCompat
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.