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Proof of Theorem 4, p. 11, (17) — given (16), efficiency (14) holds iff d(S,g)d(S,g)d(S,g) is the largest feasible shift

Proved
CooperationGraphs.FairRule.efficientGF_iff_isGreatest

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let www be a game in graph function form and let Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN satisfy (16) with numbers d(S,g)d(S,g)d(S,g): for every graph ggg and component S∈N/gS\in N/gS∈N/g, Yn(g)−tn(g)=d(S,g)Y_n(g)-t_n(g)=d(S,g)Yn​(g)−tn​(g)=d(S,g) for all n∈Sn\in Sn∈S, where tn(g)=∑h⊂g(−1)∣g∣+∣h∣+1Yn(h)t_n(g)=\sum_{h\subset g}(-1)^{|g|+|h|+1}Y_n(h)tn​(g)=∑h⊂g​(−1)∣g∣+∣h∣+1Yn​(h). Then YYY satisfies the efficiency condition (14), (Yn(g))n∈S∈∂w(S,g)(Y_n(g))_{n\in S}\in\partial w(S,g)(Yn​(g))n∈S​∈∂w(S,g) for every ggg and S∈N/gS\in N/gS∈N/g, if and only if

d(S,g)=max⁡{x∣(x+tm(g))m∈S∈w(S,g)}for all (S,g)∈ESG.(17)d(S,g)=\max\{x \mid (x+t_m(g))_{m\in S}\in w(S,g)\}\qquad\text{for all }(S,g)\in ESG.\tag{17}d(S,g)=max{x∣(x+tm​(g))m∈S​∈w(S,g)}for all (S,g)∈ESG.(17)

Together with (16), this reduces the fair allocation rule of a graph function game to the explicit recursion (18).

Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as 0<n0<n0<n. The paper's (17) writes Yn(h)Y_n(h)Yn​(h) under the index m∈Sm\in Sm∈S; we read Ym(h)Y_m(h)Ym​(h), as in (18b). "d(S,g)d(S,g)d(S,g) equals the maximum" is stated as "d(S,g)d(S,g)d(S,g) is the greatest element of the set" (IsGreatest). The numbers d(S,g)d(S,g)d(S,g) are an arbitrary function of (g,S)(g,S)(g,S), read only on embedded subgraphs. ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier in RS\mathbb R^SRS.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule

open Finset
open scoped Classical

/-- Proof of Theorem 4, p. 11, (17): if `Y` satisfies (16) with numbers `d(S,g)`, then `Y` satisfies
the efficiency condition (14) iff for every embedded subgraph `(S, g)`, `d(S,g)` is the maximum of
`{x | (x + t_i(g))_{i ∈ S} ∈ w(S,g)}`. -/
theorem efficientGF_iff_isGreatest {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (G : GraphFunctionGame n) (Y : Rule n)
    (d : SimpleGraph (Fin n) → Finset (Fin n) → ℝ)
    (hd : ∀ g : SimpleGraph (Fin n), ∀ S ∈ quot univ g, ∀ i ∈ S, Y g i - altSum Y g i = d g S) :
    IsEfficientGF G Y ↔
      ∀ g : SimpleGraph (Fin n), ∀ S ∈ quot univ g,
        IsGreatest {x : ℝ | (fun i : ↥S => x + altSum Y g i) ∈ G.w g S} (d g S) := by sorry

end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), proof of Theorem 4, p. 11, (17)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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