Proposition 2(2), p. 13 — when , and the malicious consumer purchases iff
ProvedReviewBlackmail.Central.proposition_2_2equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1ransomreview-blackmail
Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, let and suppose the mechanism efficiency is high relative to its cost,
Then:
- the greatest ransom at which settling is the prevailing (seller-preferred) equilibrium is
- the malicious consumer purchases if and only if .
In this regime the mechanism caps the ransom: a higher demand would make reporting the seller's preferred response.
Formalization Note is the greatest element (IsGreatest) of the set of ransoms at which settling prevails; the set is not restricted to (at and the ransom is ). No hypothesis beyond the standing assumptions and is added.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central
theorem proposition_2_2 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (γ δ : ℝ) (hγ : γ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hδ : δ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hcase : M.c < γ * δ * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N))) :
IsGreatest {r : ℝ | M.SettlePrevails (γ * δ) r}
((1 - γ * δ) * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .c) .N)) + M.c) ∧
(M.Purchases (γ * δ) ↔
M.p < (1 - γ * δ) * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .c) .N)) + M.c) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 13, Proposition 2(2), (2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.