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Proposition 2.10 — G = μ-NoG ⊕_{μ,γ} NSG

Proved
DecompGames.Duplication.proposition_2_10

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-decompositionorthogonal-decompositionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let NNN be a finite set of players; player iii has a finite strategy set SiS^iSi, and S=∏i∈NSiS=\prod_{i\in N}S^iS=∏i∈N​Si is the set of strategy profiles. A game is a vector g=(gi)i∈Ng=(g^i)_{i\in N}g=(gi)i∈N​ of payoff functions gi:S→Rg^i:S\to\mathbb Rgi:S→R; G\mathcal GG is the space of games. For i∈Ni\in Ni∈N let μi\mu^iμi be a strictly positive measure on SiS^iSi, μ(s)=∏iμi(si)\mu(s)=\prod_i\mu^i(s^i)μ(s)=∏i​μi(si) the product measure, μi(Si)=∑tiμi(ti)\mu^i(S^i)=\sum_{t^i}\mu^i(t^i)μi(Si)=∑ti​μi(ti), and let γ=(γi)i∈N\gamma=(\gamma^i)_{i\in N}γ=(γi)i∈N​ be a co-measure vector, γi\gamma^iγi a strictly positive function of s−is^{-i}s−i.

Let ⟨g1,g2⟩μ,γ=∑iμi(Si)⟨γig1i,γig2i⟩0\langle g_1,g_2\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}=\sum_{i}\mu^i(S^i)\langle\gamma^ig_1^i,\gamma^ig_2^i\rangle_0⟨g1​,g2​⟩μ,γ​=∑i​μi(Si)⟨γig1i​,γig2i​⟩0​ with ⟨h,f⟩0=∑sμ(s)h(s)f(s)\langle h,f\rangle_0=\sum_s\mu(s)h(s)f(s)⟨h,f⟩0​=∑s​μ(s)h(s)f(s) (2.13)–(2.15). The space of games is the direct orthogonal sum of the μ\muμ-normalized and the nonstrategic games:

G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γNSG.(2.16)\mathcal G=\mu\text{-}\mathsf{NoG}\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}\mathsf{NSG}. \qquad (2.16)G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γ​NSG.(2.16)

That is, every game ggg can be written in exactly one way as g=a+bg=a+bg=a+b with aaa μ\muμ-normalized and bbb nonstrategic, and ⟨a,b⟩μ,γ=0\langle a,b\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}=0⟨a,b⟩μ,γ​=0 for every μ\muμ-normalized aaa and every nonstrategic bbb.

This is the first decomposition of the paper; with uniform μi\mu^iμi and γi\gamma^iγi it is the normalized/nonstrategic split of Candogan et al. (2011).

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: standing assumptions n ≥ 2 players and |Sⁱ| ≥ 2 strategies for every player (p. 7) → any finite type of players ι and any finite strategy sets S i, of any size; reason: the result holds without these assumptions (with an empty Sⁱ the space of profiles is empty and every game is 0); every instance of the source is an instance of the Lean statement
  • encoding: μⁱ a strictly positive finite measure on Sⁱ → μ i : S i → ℝ, the point masses, with 0 < μ i a for all a (IsMeasureVec); reason: a measure on a finite set is determined by its point masses; μⁱ(Sⁱ) is mass μ i = ∑ₐ μ i a
  • encoding: γⁱ a co-measure, a strictly positive measure on S⁻ⁱ (Definition 2.1) → γ i : (∀ j, S j) → ℝ positive with γ i (Function.update s i a) = γ i s (IsCoMeasureVec); reason: functions on S⁻ⁱ are exactly the functions on S that do not depend on the coordinate sⁱ
  • encoding: statements over s⁻ⁱ ∈ S⁻ⁱ and profiles (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) → statements over full profiles s : ∀ j, S j, with (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) written Function.update s i tⁱ; reason: the coordinate sⁱ of s is overwritten, so the quantifier ranges over the same subprofiles
  • encoding: g nonstrategic: for each i there is ℓⁱ : S⁻ⁱ → ℝ with gⁱ(sⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) = ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) (2.4) → gⁱ(Function.update s i a) = gⁱ(s) for all i, s, a (IsNonstrategic); reason: a function on S is of the form ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) exactly when it does not depend on sⁱ
  • encoding: G is the direct ⟨·,·⟩{μ,γ}-orthogonal sum ⊕{μ,γ} of the classes → every game has exactly one representation as a sum of members of the classes (∃!), and members of different classes are ⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}-orthogonal; reason: this is the meaning of a direct orthogonal sum of subspaces; each class is a linear subspace
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DecompGames_Duplication_Operators
Formal statement
namespace DecompGames.Duplication

open Finset

/-- Proposition 2.10, p. 10, (2.16): `G = μ-NoG ⊕_{μ,γ} NSG`. Every game is uniquely the sum of a
`μ`-normalized and a nonstrategic game, and the two classes are `⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}`-orthogonal. -/
theorem proposition_2_10 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type}
    [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (μ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (hμ : IsMeasureVec μ)
    (γ : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (hγ : IsCoMeasureVec γ) :
    (∀ g : Game ι S, ∃! ab : Game ι S × Game ι S,
      IsNormalized μ ab.1 ∧ IsNonstrategic ab.2 ∧ g = ab.1 + ab.2) ∧
    ∀ a b : Game ι S, IsNormalized μ a → IsNonstrategic b → ipGame μ γ a b = 0 := by sorry

end DecompGames.Duplication
Source
Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini & Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, p. 10, Proposition 2.10, (2.16)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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