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THEOREM A (§3), p. 1133 — if player i plays a solution of (3.1) every period, all regrets Rⁱ_t(j,k), j ≠ k, converge to 0 a.s.

Proved
RegretMatching.Approach.theorem_A

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

almost-sure-convergencecorrelated-equilibriumno-regretp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1regret-matching

Let Γ\GammaΓ be a finite game and fix a player iii. The game is played repeatedly; given the history hth_tht​, players randomize independently. Suppose that at every period t+1t+1t+1 (for t≥1t\ge1t≥1) player iii chooses strategies according to a probability vector qti∈Δ(Si)q^i_t\in\Delta(S^i)qti​∈Δ(Si) that satisfies (3.1):

∑k∈Siqti(k)Rti(k,j)=qti(j)∑k∈SiRti(j,k)for every j∈Si,\sum_{k\in S^i}q^i_t(k)R^i_t(k,j)=q^i_t(j)\sum_{k\in S^i}R^i_t(j,k)\qquad\text{for every }j\in S^i,k∈Si∑​qti​(k)Rti​(k,j)=qti​(j)k∈Si∑​Rti​(j,k)for every j∈Si,

with Rti(j,j):=0R^i_t(j,j):=0Rti​(j,j):=0. Nothing is assumed about how the other players choose their strategies, and player iii's first-period strategy is arbitrary. Then, almost surely,

Rti(j,k)⟶0(t→∞)for every j,k∈Si with j≠k.R^i_t(j,k)\longrightarrow0\quad(t\to\infty)\qquad\text{for every }j,k\in S^i\text{ with }j\ne k .Rti​(j,k)⟶0(t→∞)for every j,k∈Si with j=k.

By the Proposition of §3, this implies that when every player follows such a procedure, the empirical distributions of play converge almost surely to the set of correlated equilibria (the Corollary).

Formalization Note. Behaviour is a profile σ\sigmaσ assigning to each period, history and player a probability vector; only player iii's component is constrained, by (3.1) at every history of length t+1≥1t+1\ge1t+1≥1. The play is any sequence of random variables on any probability space whose conditional law given each positive-probability history is the product of the players' mixed actions. The quantifier "for every j≠kj\ne kj=k" is placed inside the almost-sure statement, which is equivalent since SiS^iSi is finite.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RegretMatching_Approach_Setting

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace RegretMatching.Approach

theorem theorem_A
    {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)] [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (i : ι)
    (σ : (t : ℕ) → (Fin t → (∀ i, S i)) → (i' : ι) → S i' → ℝ)
    (hσ : ∀ (t : ℕ) (h : Fin t → (∀ i, S i)) (i' : ι), σ t h i' ∈ stdSimplex ℝ (S i'))
    (h31 : ∀ (t : ℕ) (h : Fin (t + 1) → (∀ i, S i)), SatisfiesEq31 u h i (σ (t + 1) h i))
    (Ω : Type) [MeasurableSpace Ω] (P : Measure Ω) [IsProbabilityMeasure P]
    (play : ℕ → Ω → (∀ i, S i)) (hplay : RegretMatching.Main.IsPlay σ P play) :
    ∀ᵐ ω ∂P, ∀ j k : S i, j ≠ k →
      Tendsto (fun t : ℕ => RegretMatching.Main.regretR u (hist play (t + 1) ω) i j k) atTop (𝓝 0) := by sorry

end RegretMatching.Approach
Source
Hart and Mas-Colell, A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000), p. 1133, THEOREM A and REMARK
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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