The male-propose mechanism is strategy-proof for the men
ProvedAGT.male_propose_strategyproofNo man can game the male-propose mechanism: any mechanism selecting the male-optimal stable matching is strategy-proof for the men (Theorem 10.13 of Algorithmic Game Theory; Dubins–Freedman, Roth) — this mission's goal. Let be any mechanism that, on every profile of strict preferences, returns a male-optimal stable matching in the man-by-man sense of Gale–Shapley — the Deferred Acceptance outcome, unique by strictness, and equivalently characterized by the book's no-Pareto-improvement form of Theorem 10.11. Then for every profile, every man , and every misreported ordering of the women, the wife assigns after the misreport either equals or is truly-worse than the wife assigns him under truth.
A note on the rendering. Only the men are protected: the women can famously manipulate the male-propose mechanism, and nothing of the sort is claimed for them. The mechanism is pinned by its defining property rather than by algorithm internals, and it is quantified before the misreport, so the witness must serve every deviation — nothing is chosen with hindsight. The hypothesis that selects male-optimal stable matchings is satisfiable by Theorem 10.11.
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
namespace AGT
/-- The male-propose mechanism is strategy-proof for the men (Theorem 10.13
of *Algorithmic Game Theory*; Dubins–Freedman, Roth) — the capstone of the
mission. Formally: any mechanism selecting, on every profile of strict
preferences, the male-optimal stable matching (the male-propose Deferred
Acceptance outcome, Theorem 10.11) leaves no man able to obtain a wife he
truly prefers by misreporting his ordering. The women, famously, can
manipulate; nothing of the sort is claimed for them. -/
theorem male_propose_strategyproof {M W : Type*} [Fintype M] [Fintype W]
[DecidableEq M]
(F : (M → W → W → Prop) → (W → M → M → Prop) → M ≃ W)
(hF : ∀ PM PW, IsPrefProfile PM → IsPrefProfile PW →
IsMaleOptimal PM PW (F PM PW)) :
∀ PM PW, IsPrefProfile PM → IsPrefProfile PW →
∀ m (r' : W → W → Prop), IsStrictTotalOrder W r' →
F (Function.update PM m r') PW m = F PM PW m ∨
PM m (F PM PW m) (F (Function.update PM m r') PW m) := by
sorry
end AGTRead-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5
Read-back: male_propose_strategyproof
Setting. Let and be finite types, with decidable equality assumed on (needed for the pointwise profile update below); either may be empty. Profiles: assigns to each a binary relation on (write when the relation holds of ), and assigns to each a binary relation on . The theorem is about an arbitrary given function
total on all inputs (including non-profiles), with no construction (such as deferred acceptance) appearing in the statement. Note a hidden consequence of the binder itself: since relation families always exist, the mere assumption that a function into the type of bijections exists forces that type to be nonempty, i.e. ; no explicit cardinality hypothesis is stated.
Hypothesis . For all pairs in which every is a strict total order on and every is a strict total order on (trichotomous, irreflexive, transitive), the bijection is male-optimal, which unfolds to the conjunction:
- is stable: — no blocking pair;
- for every bijection that is stable in the same sense, and every : or .
Conclusion. For every pair of profiles with all individual relations strict total orders, for every man , and for every strict total order on , writing for the men's family agreeing with except that 's relation is replaced by :
That is: the woman is matched to when his slot carries is the same as under the original profile; or 's original relation holds of the ordered pair (partner under the original profiles, partner under the deviated profiles). The disjunction is inclusive; the comparison always uses , never , which enters only through the input handed to .
Points to note.
- Only men deviate, and only the men's profile is updated; the women's profile is held fixed throughout, and nothing whatsoever is claimed about deviations by women.
- Nothing is asserted about the partners of men other than , nor about outcomes on inputs that are not strict-total-order profiles ('s values there are unconstrained by both hypothesis and conclusion).
- The conclusion is the literal disjunction shown, not the formally different "".
- Degenerate cases: if and are both empty, all quantifications over are vacuous and the statement holds trivially; if exactly one is empty no of the displayed type exists, so the theorem is vacuous for such instances. If no satisfies (e.g. if male-optimal matchings fail to exist for some profile), the theorem is vacuously true for every such ; it asserts the implication for every of the displayed type satisfying .
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).