Lemma 7 — the voting procedure derived from a strict SWF with CS, NNR, IIA is strategy-proof with full range
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.lemma_7arrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness
Consider a strict committee with individuals and alternatives, and a strict social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR and IIA. Then:
- a voting procedure derived from exists, that is, one with for every ;
- every voting procedure derived from is strategy-proof and has range
Lemma 7 is the first half of the correspondence of Theorem 2: it maps every Arrovian strict social welfare function to a strict strategy-proof voting procedure with full range.
Formalization Note "The voting procedure derived from " is formalized relationally through Underlies u v, together with the existence of such a ; for a strong social ordering on a finite set the top element is unique, so this is the paper's derived procedure. The range is taken over strict ballot sets. CS is read for , NNR for every .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem lemma_7 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hcs : CS u) (hnnr : NNR u) (hiia : IIA u) :
(∃ v : StrongProfile ι A → A, Underlies u v) ∧
∀ v : StrongProfile ι A → A, Underlies u v →
StrategyProof v ∧ Set.range v = Set.univ := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 7, p. 30
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.