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Lemma 7 — the voting procedure derived from a strict SWF with CS, NNR, IIA is strategy-proof with full range

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.lemma_7

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

arrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness

Consider a strict committee with n≥2n\ge2n≥2 individuals and m≥3m\ge3m≥3 alternatives, and a strict social welfare function u:ρmn→ρmu:\rho_m^n\to\rho_mu:ρmn​→ρm​ satisfying CS, NNR and IIA. Then:

  1. a voting procedure v:ρmn→Smv:\rho_m^n\to S_mv:ρmn​→Sm​ derived from uuu exists, that is, one with ΨSm[u(B)]={v(B)}\Psi_{S_m}[u(B)]=\{v(B)\}ΨSm​​[u(B)]={v(B)} for every B∈ρmnB\in\rho_m^nB∈ρmn​;
  2. every voting procedure vvv derived from uuu is strategy-proof and has range
Tp={v(B):B∈ρmn}=Sm.T_p=\{v(B): B\in\rho_m^n\}=S_m.Tp​={v(B):B∈ρmn​}=Sm​.

Lemma 7 is the first half of the correspondence of Theorem 2: it maps every Arrovian strict social welfare function to a strict strategy-proof voting procedure with full range.

Formalization Note "The voting procedure derived from uuu" is formalized relationally through Underlies u v, together with the existence of such a vvv; for a strong social ordering on a finite set the top element is unique, so this is the paper's derived procedure. The range is taken over strict ballot sets. CS is read for x≠yx\ne yx=y, NNR for every xxx.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence

theorem lemma_7 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
    (u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hcs : CS u) (hnnr : NNR u) (hiia : IIA u) :
    (∃ v : StrongProfile ι A → A, Underlies u v) ∧
      ∀ v : StrongProfile ι A → A, Underlies u v →
        StrategyProof v ∧ Set.range v = Set.univ := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Lemma 7, p. 30
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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