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Lemma 2 (regular part), p. 5 — the revenue of a truthful mechanism is at most ∑ipiMqiM\sum_i p^M_i q^M_i∑i​piM​qiM​

Proved
CHMSPricing.UnitDemand.revenue_le_sum_price_mul_prob

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

mechanism-designmyersonp2o-batch-pfp1bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue

Consider a single-parameter instance with independent values vi∼Fiv_i \sim F_ivi​∼Fi​, each FiF_iFi​ regular, and any set system J\mathcal JJ. Let MMM be a truthful mechanism, let qiMq^M_iqiM​ be the probability (over v1,…,vnv_1,\dots,v_nv1​,…,vn​) that MMM allocates to agent iii, and let piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​), the point of the support with Fi(piM)=1−qiMF_i(p^M_i) = 1 - q^M_iFi​(piM​)=1−qiM​. Then

RM≤∑ipiMqiM.\mathcal R^M \le \sum_i p^M_i q^M_i.RM≤i∑​piM​qiM​.

Applied to the instance with copies, this bounds the optimal revenue by a sum of single-agent posted-price revenues, the quantity the order-oblivious prices of Theorem 13 are compared with.

Formalization Note Only the first (regular) paragraph of Lemma 2 is stated; the second paragraph, about non-regular distributions and pairs of prices, is out of scope. The inverse distribution function is not defined: the prices piMp^M_ipiM​ are arguments, tied to qiMq^M_iqiM​ by the hypothesis piM∈[v‾i,v‾i]p^M_i \in [\underline v_i, \overline v_i]piM​∈[v​i​,vi​] and Fi(piM)=1−qiMF_i(p^M_i) = 1 - q^M_iFi​(piM​)=1−qiM​; such a point exists and is unique since FiF_iFi​ is continuous and strictly increasing on the support. Regularity is assumed as in the paper.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CHMSPricing_UnitDemand_Mechanism
Formal statement
namespace CHMSPricing.UnitDemand

/-- Lemma 2 (regular part), p. 5: if every `Fᵢ` is regular, the revenue of every truthful
mechanism `M` is at most `∑ᵢ p^M_i q^M_i`, where `q^M_i` is the probability that `M` serves
agent `i` and `p^M_i = Fᵢ⁻¹(1 − q^M_i)` (the point of the support with `Fᵢ(p^M_i) = 1 − q^M_i`). -/
theorem revenue_le_sum_price_mul_prob {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    (D : ι → ValueDist) (hreg : ∀ i, (D i).Regular) (𝒥 : SetSystem ι)
    (M : Mechanism ι) (hM : IsTruthful D 𝒥 M) (pM : ι → ℝ)
    (hpM : ∀ i, pM i ∈ Set.Icc (D i).lo (D i).hi ∧ (D i).cdf (pM i) = 1 - servProb D M i) :
    revenue D M ≤ ∑ i, pM i * servProb D M i := by sorry

end CHMSPricing.UnitDemand
Source
Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, p. 5, Lemma 2, first paragraph (restated p. 13, App. A)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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