Proposition 1(1), p. 13 — an equilibrium with (ignore the blackmail) exists iff
ProvedReviewBlackmail.Central.proposition_1_1best-responseequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail
Suppose a malicious consumer enters the system, posts a negative review, and demands a ransom . Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, with and , doing nothing () is an equilibrium response, i.e. the seller has no profitable deviation when the market believes he ignores blackmail, if and only if
Ignoring the blackmail is an equilibrium when the ransom is high and the mechanism is inefficient.
Formalization Note The statement holds for every real . The hypothesis is added because the page divides by (at the page means , while Lean's would make the statement false).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central
theorem proposition_1_1 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (γ δ : ℝ) (hγ : γ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hδ : δ ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (hpos : 0 < γ * δ) (hlt : γ * δ < 1) (r : ℝ) :
M.IsEq (γ * δ) .n r ↔
max (M.π M.a - r) (M.π M.a - M.c / (γ * δ)) ≤ M.π (M.post (keep (γ * δ) .n) .N) := by sorry
end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), pp. 12–13, Proposition 1(1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.