§4.2.2, p. 497 — late commitment (weakly) dominates early commitment: Π₁*ᴱ ≤ Π₁*ᴸ
ProvedMitigateSupplyRisk.LateCommit.late_dominates_earlyinventoryp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1real-optionssupplier-selectionsupply-risk
For any two suppliers (not necessarily similar), the optimal late-commitment profit is at least the optimal early-commitment profit:
Postponing supplier selection until the improvement outcomes are observed hedges against an improvement failure, so it can never hurt. This is the baseline against which Theorem 5 asks when the inequality is strict.
Formalization Note The paper states this as a sentence of §4.2.2 without a number. Both sides are suprema of nonempty sets that are bounded above, and neither is assumed to be attained.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MitigateSupplyRisk_LateCommit_Model
Formal statement
namespace MitigateSupplyRisk.LateCommit
/-- §4.2.2 (p. 497): late commitment (weakly) dominates early commitment,
`Π₁^{*E} ≤ Π₁^{*L}`, for arbitrary (not necessarily identical) suppliers. -/
theorem late_dominates_early (X : Setting) : X.earlyValue ≤ X.lateValue := by sorry
end MitigateSupplyRisk.LateCommit
Source
Wang, Gilland, Tomlin, Mitigating Supply Risk: Dual Sourcing or Process Improvement?, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 12(3):489–510 (2010), p. 497 (PDF p. 9), §4.2.2, first paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.