Lemma 2, p. 24 — a manufacturer of quality q prices low (pL) iff te > 1/(2 − q), else high (pH)
ProvedShoppertainment.OptimalBandwidth.lemma_2Consider a manufacturer of quality selling through the streamer, with commission rate , good-fit value , attending traffic and entertainment bandwidth . Its profit at price is , with the demand of (8) built from and .
- If , then and is the unique profit-maximizing price:
- If , then and maximizes profit: for every .
This is the manufacturers' equilibrium pricing rule. It is the only place where their decision enters the model, and it is what the consumer surplus and the streamer's profitability are built from.
Formalization Note The printed display (10) reads , with the quality threshold , for a manufacturer of quality . The proof in Online Supplementary A.2 (p. S3) and Figure 4(b) use the manufacturer's own threshold , and the printed reading would make every manufacturer price low once , contradicting Proposition 1. The statement therefore uses . Two hypotheses are pinned: (at every positive price earns and is not an admissible price, since prices are positive, p. 13), and (at every price earns and is not the unique maximizer). At both prices earn the same profit, so only maximality of is claimed in the second case.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Shoppertainment_OptimalBandwidth_Model
namespace Shoppertainment.OptimalBandwidth
theorem lemma_2 (α v te q T : ℝ) (hα : 0 < α) (hα1 : α < 1) (hv : 0 < v) (hT : 0 < T)
(hq : 0 < q) (hq1 : q ≤ 1) (hte : te ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) 1) :
(1 / (2 - q) < te → 0 < pL v te q ∧ ∀ p : ℝ, 0 < p → p ≠ pL v te q →
mfrProfit α v te q T p < mfrProfit α v te q T (pL v te q)) ∧
(te ≤ 1 / (2 - q) → 0 < pH v te q ∧ ∀ p : ℝ, 0 < p →
mfrProfit α v te q T p ≤ mfrProfit α v te q T (pH v te q)) := by sorry
end Shoppertainment.OptimalBandwidth
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.