Proposition 3.2 — every equilibrium guarantees every affordable ℓ-out-of-d maximin share
ProvedGenericBudgets.MaximinShare.proposition_3_2Let be a finite set of agents, a finite set of indivisible items, and an arbitrary cardinal valuation on bundles for each agent. Let the positive budgets satisfy , and let be a competitive equilibrium. For any agent and natural numbers with and , the allocated bundle guarantees her -out-of- maximin share:
Thus equilibrium gives an entitlement-sensitive fairness guarantee for every rational share no larger than an agent's budget, even when preferences are not additive.
Formalization Note The Lean goal uses the equivalent quantified form of the finite max–min formula. Positive normalized budgets are the paper's standing assumptions. No additivity, monotonicity, valuation normalization, or strictness is assumed for this proposition; follows from the displayed budget condition and budget normalization. Partitions may contain empty parts. Lean agents and items are zero-indexed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GenericBudgets_MaximinShare_Setting
namespace GenericBudgets.MaximinShare
/-- Proposition 3.2: every competitive equilibrium gives each agent her
`ℓ`-out-of-`d` maximin share when `ℓ / d` does not exceed her budget. -/
theorem proposition_3_2 {n m : ℕ} (v : Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ)
(b : Fin n → ℝ) (hb : ∀ i, 0 < b i) (hsum : ∑ i, b i = 1)
(σ : Fin m → Fin n) (p : Fin m → ℝ) (hCE : IsCE v b σ p)
(i : Fin n) (ℓ d : ℕ) (hd : 0 < d) (hℓd : (ℓ : ℝ) / d ≤ b i) :
GuaranteesMMS v σ i ℓ d := by sorry
end GenericBudgets.MaximinShare
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.