Lemma 21: agents with the same functions have equal budgets (corrected: with )
ProvedCardinalMatching.lemma_21envy-freenesshylland-zeckhausermatching-marketsp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1pareto-optimalityppad
Let be agents of with , i.e. for every budget , where is the set of goods that can be positive in an optimal bundle of agent at budget (Definition 20). Then
The statement is made in the running context of Step 2 (IsStep2Context): admissible parameters of (with correction C1), an EF+PO allocation of , positive weights for which maximizes , and an optimal dual , with budgets .
Differences from the source:
- correction: k ≥ n³/ε in the construction of I′ (p.8) → k ≥ n⁴/ε and k ≥ n⁴ (ModParams.Admissible); reason: as printed, interpolating agents can outnumber the k/n awesome goods so |A′| = |G′| is impossible: n = 5, ε = 1/15625, k = n³/ε, u₁ = u₂ = 0, u₃ = u₄ = (1,…,1), u₅ = (1, .99, .98, .97, .96) gives 468 748 interpolating agents vs 390 625 awesome goods; n = 3, ε = 100, k = 3, u₁ = u₃ = 0, u₂ = (1,1,1) gives 4 vs 1
- reading: dummies: "every agent has utility 2" for awesome goods (item 2) vs "identical utilities for all goods" (item 4) → every dummy values every good of G′, awesome goods included, at one common d ≥ 0, quantified over d; reason: the two printed items conflict for dummies; item 4 is the more specific
- reading: types t₁, …, tₙ ordered "in some arbitrary way"; chains between u_i and u_i′ (p.8) → types are the copy classes of the n original goods; the order and the direction of each pair's chain are free parameters, quantified over; the chain lists the vectors strictly between its ends after each ε-step, the last step possibly shorter; reason: the paper leaves these choices arbitrary; quantifying covers every choice
- generalization: a rational EF+PO allocation x on I′ (p.8) built from rational utilities → any real EF+PO allocation x of I′, real utilities in [0,1]; reason: the statement does not use rationality; it specializes to the rational case
- reading: θ_i(t) is a set of goods "j ∈ G" (Definition 20) → θ_i(t) ⊆ G′; reason: LP (1) defining θ ranges over G′ (its constraint sums over j ∈ G′)
- generalization: the data rescaled to maximal non-dummy budget 1, assumed from Lemma 16 on (p.10) → the rescaling is not assumed; reason: the statement holds for every scale; it specializes to the rescaled data
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CardinalMatching_ModParams import Definitions.Def_CardinalMatching_ModParams_IsStep2Context import Definitions.Def_CardinalMatching_ModParams_theta
Formal statement
namespace CardinalMatching
/-- **Lemma 21** (Tröbst–Vazirani, *Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets*, arXiv:2402.08851v6, p.12): "Let i, i′ be two agents with θi = θi′, then bi = bi′."
`θ_i = θ_i′` is equality of the functions `t ↦ θ_i(t)` on `t ≥ 0` (Definition 20, p.11, with the
prices `p` of Step 2). Running context of Step 2 (`IsStep2Context`). -/
theorem lemma_21 {n : ℕ} (P : ModParams n) (x : P.Agent → P.Good → ℝ) (α : P.Agent → ℝ)
(p : P.Good → ℝ) (q : P.Agent → ℝ) (hC : P.IsStep2Context x α p q) (i i' : P.Agent)
(hθ : ∀ t : ℝ, 0 ≤ t → P.theta p i t = P.theta p i' t) :
P.budget x α q i = P.budget x α q i' := by sorry
end CardinalMatching
Source
Tröbst, Vazirani, Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets, arXiv:2402.08851v6, Lemma 21, p.12; Definition 20, p.11
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.